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Is There Still Hope In Fiji? 
F 
or the first time since Fiji's 
coup of 14 May, there may be a 
glimmer of hope for a political 
solution that will not hurl the 
nation back into the Dark Ages. 
The compromise arising from the 
Great Council of Chiefs' meeting in 
late July, while far from satisfactory, 
represents a defeat for extreme 
racists from the Taukei Movement. 
The decision came amidst 
continuing civil disorder and 
harassment b) the military. along 
with pressu re from Taukei 
extremists. to have Fiji declared a 
republic. pre-colonial laws reinstated 
and non-indigenous Fijians stripped 
of their political rights. 
The Taukei had succeeded in 
pushing their ideas through nine of 
the fourteen provincial councils that 
represent rural-dwelling indigenous 
Fijians. with the other five councils 
that represent rural-dwdling 
indigenous Fijians taktng only shghtl~ 
more moderate positions. The~ had 
gone so far as to design a flag for the 
new republic (based on the colours of 
the military) and went into the 
Council of Chiefs' mectmg optimistic 
that a republic was about to be 
declared and that a nc\\ parliament 
would be completely in the hands of 
indigenous Fijians. 
Resistance to the extreme 
Taukei position. however. has been 
growing throughout Fijian society. 
Supporters of the overthrown 
Bavadra government focused their 
efforts on maintaining economic 
sanctions against the military-
backed regime. while Ba,adra and 
his colleagues sought to negotiate 
with the Governor-General. 
A small. open econom~ such as 
Fiji's is extremely vulnerable. and the 
economic consequences of the coup 
were felt immediately. The two main 
income earners. sugar and tourism. 
became the focal points of conflict 
between supporters of the military 
regime and those backing the 
Bavadra go\crnmcnt. Tourist 
arri\als dropped off drasticall~ after 
the coup. with the hotel occupanc~ 
rate falling to around 10rc in June. 
Mean\\hile. with the 'ugar cane 
han est about to begin. cane gro\\ers 
and cutters refmed to hanest. 
The effects were felt throughout 
the econom\. Hotels account for a 
large percen.tage of electncit~ usage 
and. by June. consumption ''as 
reported to ha\c dropped b~ 50'( 
nation-wide . Consumption of 
petroleum pr.:>ducts declined by 30C:C. 
Large numbers of workers were laid 
off and man) others faced reduced 
wages and hours. 
Time was an important factor 
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with the economic struggle. Austral-
ia provides the bulk of Fiji's tourists 
and the important Australian school 
holiday period was about to begin in 
July. The sugar crop was under 
added threat by a severe drought that 
was causing the cane to dry out even 
faster than normal. Foreign reserves 
had been F$160 million on the eve of 
the coup and, by the end of the third 
week of June, they stood at F$113 
million. 
At the request of the Fiji Trades 
Union Congress, unions in Australia 
and New Zealand had imposed cargo 
and passenger bans on Fiji. Strong 
pressure was brought to bear from 
many directions to have them ended. 
Bans were lifted on necessary food 
and medical supplies, timber exports 
and the movement of Australian 
passengers over the course of several 
weeks. but many of the bans 
remained in place. 
The regime launched "Operat· 
ion Bounceback" in an attempt to 
lure tourists to Fiji . This included 
lobbying the travel industry and 
cutting airfares on the national 
airline. Air Pacific . Bavadra 
supporters responded by publicising 
potential dangers and inconven-
iences facing would-be tourists. 
Rapes. robberies and other forms of 
\IOience had increased substantiall). 
w1th some tourists being among the 
victims. 
Operation Bounceback was a 
partial success and hotel occupanc~ 
rates during the school holiday 
period d1d increase (to around 25'() 
But the amount of mone} that th1~ 
put back into the economy was 
limited b~ the .. leakage factor .. that 
\\a~ normal to the industr} and b} 
the hea' y discounting of airfares and 
accommodation. 
The threat to the sugar crop was 
a much more erious problem 
because of its greater importance to 
the econom\· as a \\hole. Almo~t 
constant intim1dation. mcluding 
passage of sc\ ere Emergenc~ 
Regulations. had failed to force th~ 
maJorit) of cane growers to hanest 
their cane. ~egot 1ations between 
representati,es of the growers and 
the go\ernment were stalled O\er 
financial 1ssues. and sentiment 
among growers against the reg1mt' 
remained st rong. 
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A small amount of sugar was 
harvested towards the end of June 
and two of Fiji's four mills began 
crushing, but actions by mill workers 
(including sabotage of equipment 
and walkouts over harassment by the 
military) soon forced the mills to shut 
down. Only enough cane had been 
produced for one month's local 
consumption. 
A particular concern for Taukei 
and other pro-coup elements has 
been continued opposition to them 
from within indigenous Fijian 
society. Two sources of opposition 
are especially noteworthy: liberal 
members of the Methodist church 
and regional antagonism. 
Approximately two-thirds of 
indigenous Fijians belong to the 
Methodist Church and its influence 
within Fijian society is considerable. 
A group of church leaders had 
backed the Taukei Movement even 
before the coup, the most prominent 
being Tomasi Raikivi (Secretary of 
the Fiji Council of Churches), but 
many influential members of the 
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church had been highly critical of its 
racism and violence. Raikivi (who is 
presently information adviser to the 
Governor-General) was forced to 
resign his position with the Council 
of Churches after leading anti-Indian 
demonstrations. 
The President of the Methodist 
Church, Josateki Koroi, and other 
church leaders, issued a statement 
condemning the coup on the day that 
it took place. Since then, many 
church leaders have supported 
efforts to return the country to 
democracy. In a letter to the Fiji Sun 
on 9 July. with the title "Klaus Barbie 
& Fiji", the Rev. Akuila Yabaki, 
Communication Secretary of the 
Methodist Church, wrote "Racism is 
a heresy against God whether it is 
Nazi Germany, South Africa or Fiji" 
and commented that "The links with 
recent events in Fiji is perhaps 
uncomfortably close" with those in 
Nazi Germany. 
The most recent development is 
the emergence of the "Back to Early 
May" movement. Among those 
behind it are a number of important 
figures in the church, including 
Daniel Mastapha (the former 
president of the Methodist Church 
who resigned from the Council of 
Advisers after its first meeting) and 
Akuila Yabaki. It has called on the 
Governor-General "to return to our 
present constitution and to re-
summon the dissolved parliament" 
and "to order all troops to return to 
barracks and to restore full charge of 
public order to the courts and the 
police": 
The regional factor is extremely 
important among indigenous 
Fijians, and the victory of the 
Bavadra-led coalition was seen by 
many as a victory against the chiefly 
eastern establishment. The coup, 
therefore, was seen as a move by this 
same group to regain control of the 
government. After being released on 
19 May, Bavadra quickly moved to 
the safety of his home village in 
western Fiji and it was in the west 
that the strongest signs of resistance 
emerged. There was soon talk of 
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secession, or of setting up a 
government in exile in the west. On 4 
June, 500 native Fijians from the 
west were stopped from visiting the 
Vunivalu (or high chief) Ratu George 
Cakobau by a group of eastern 
Fijians and the military. 
Another potential source of 
opposition is the army itself. To carry 
out the coup. those planning it had to 
step over a number of senior officers. 
Since the return of Epeli Naulatikau 
(the former commander of the army) 
from Australia on 29 May, 
speculation has been rife about a 
counter-coup. Nailatikau has been 
highly critical of the Taukei 
Movement and, in a long newspaper 
interview. discussed the need to 
"cleanse" the army of those involved 
in the coup once democracy was 
restored . 
The Taukei have sought to 
bolster their support among 
indigenous Fijians by appeals to 
racist sentiments and promotion of 
tradition. They have done so at 
meetings around the country. over 
the radio and through the Fijian 
language newspapers. They have 
prepared documents denouncing 
democracy as an imported idea 
counter to Fijian traditions and 
linking the sun·ival of mdigenous 
Fijian culture with loyalty to the 
chiefs. 
Soldiers and police associated 
with the military-backed regime have 
sought to counter resistance by 
increased intimidation. Networks of 
informers have been promoted. and 
harassment. threats and the arrest of 
those known or even suspected of 
opposing the regime have become 
commonplace. The army has grown 
in size since the coup and plans are 
afoot to purchase additional 
weapons. Soldiers are to be seen 
everywhere and they occupy many 
sites considered to be of strategic 
importance. Steps are being taken to 
establish batallion-strength 
garrisons at several points around 
the country. Most recently. Colonel 
Rabuka has begun recruiting 
members to a special counter-
insurgency unit. 
Shortly before the Council of 
Chiefs' meeting. Bavadra and the 
Governor-General were able to 
negotmte a settlement that allowed 
the Coalition members of the 
Constitutional Review Committee to 
begin taking part in the exercise. At 
around the same time. unions in 
Australia and New Zealand decided 
to lift their bans. and sugar growers 
in Fiji agreed to begin the sugar 
har\'est. 
Effort s b) the Taukei threatened 
to undermine the progress that 
seemed to have been made on the 
political and economic lronb. This 
made the Council of Chiefs· meeting 
exceptionally important: ih outcome 
playing a determining role in the 
country's future. 
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Several factors were important 
in shaping the decbion finally made 
by the council. Among them was 
Colonel Rabuka's unwillingness to 
ad' ocate breaking ties with the 
Queen . This was crucial in 
undermining the Taukei initiatiYe 
and indicated the degree of unease 
among man) conservati\'e Fijians 
about taking what. for them. v.as 
such a drastic step. Also significant 
was the fact that a number of 
individuals known to be critical of 
the coup were allowed to participate 
Such people had been kept out of the 
meeting held shortly after the coup. 
This time. although attempts were 
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made to silence Bavadra and his 
allies at the meeting, they were able 
to state their position. Others who 
did not support the Taukei extremist 
position were willing to speak out as 
well, and a negotiated compromise 
became necessary. 
Fiji now awaits the outcome of 
deliberations by the Constitutional 
Review Committee and the 
establishment of some form of 
government of national unity that is 
to be formed in its wake. Extremist 
elements associated with the Taukei 
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Movement are likely to continue to 
try to stop this process. since it 
appears unlikely that it will result in 
creation of the kind of state they 
advocate. While they would appear 
to have little chance of succeeding, 
the possibility of bringing about an 
equitable solution for the people of 
Fiji remains in doubt. Certainly the 
Council of Chiefs' proposal, with its 
communally exclusive basis for 
voting, remains unsatisfactory to 
many. Nevertheless, opposition to 
the Taukei and their allies has 
become more vocal and better 
organised, and further negotiation 
and compromise is a strong 
possibility. 
The forces of racism and 
violence unleashed by the May coup 
are still considerable and returning 
the army to an apolitical role will not 
be easy, but at last there may be some 
room for optimism. 
Michael C Howard 
The Kinnock Factor 
B 
y the end of the recent British 
general election campaign, 
Labour leader Neil Kinnock 
had almost lost his voice, but he had 
not cracked. Although the Labour 
Party made a net gain of only 20 
seats, Kinnock himself emerged with 
dignity - a bigger figure on the 
national stage than he had been 
before and one who, half-way 
through the campaign, had given the 
Conservatives the jitters. 
His biggest ~ingle achievement 
was this: he came close to suggesting 
that there was an electable 
alternative to Thatcherism. He did 
not pull it off. but it certainly 
flickered across Britain\ national 
consciousness that a party seeking to 
promote a fairer society could win. 
This is not the place to discuss 
why he failed. save to ob!>ervc that 
there were too many obstacles 
stacked against him. including the 
divided opposition. The question is 
whether he has sufficient qualities to 
win in future. 
Kin nock i~. h) any c;ta ndards. an 
unw.ual man. It is peculiar to be at 
times the hest orator in the country 
and, at others. tO be among the 
world's worst wafflers . At times he 
preaches egalitarianism. yet at others 
becomes lyrical about the virtues of 
the meritocracy. One wonders what 
he would have heen like if he had 
hecn at the Un1vcr~ity of Oxford. not 
Cardiff. More like a Thatcher than 
Aneurin Bevan, perhaps? Or another 
Harold Wilson? 
When he opted for the non-
nuclear defence policy, it looked like 
.. -:::;; wz:;;.- 'il 
Kinnock: Labour's fifth PM? 
an act of conscience with bravado 
thrown in. He went even further than 
the bulk of the Labour Party had 
seriously demanded in seeking to 
